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Abstract
This Article is written in honor of Bo Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance of
the European Communities, (”CFI”) a court in which we were both sitting as founding judges.
Without diminishing the input of Judge Vesterdorf as President of the CFI, I would like to take
this opportunity to revisit the first big cartel case that was brought to the CFI. In the so-called
Polypropylene case, I was the Judge Rapporteur, and Judge Versterdorf officiated as the Advocate
General. This case raised important issues as to evidence and procedure in European Commu-
nity competition law. Therefore, the aim of this Article is to highlight the significance of Judge
Vesterdorf’s Opinion as the Advocate General (”Vesterdorf Opinion”) in this case and the further
developments of the case law on these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is written in honor of Bo Vesterdorf, President
of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities,
("CFI") a court in which we were both sitting as founding judges.
Without diminishing the input of Judge Vesterdorf as President
of the CFI, I would like to take this opportunity to revisit the first
big cartel case that was brought to the CFI. In the so-called
Polypropylene case, I was the Judge Rapporteur, and Judge Ver-
sterdorf officiated as the Advocate General. This case raised im-
portant issues as to evidence and procedure in European Com-
munity competition law. Therefore, the aim of this Article is to
highlight the significance of Judge Vesterdorf's Opinion as the
Advocate General ("Vesterdorf Opinion") in this case' and the
further developments of the case law on these issues.
* The author is President of Chamber at the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and Professor of European Law at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. All
views expressed herein are personal to the author. The case law taken into account is as
it stands on February 28, 2007.
1. Opinion of Judge B. Vesterdorf performing the function of Advocate General,
Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867; see also Petrofina
SA v. Commission, Case T-2/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1087; Atochem SA v. Commission,
Case T-3/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1177; BASF AG v. Commission, Case T-4/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-1523; Enichem Anic SpA v. Commission, Case T-6/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1623;
SA Hercules Chems. NV v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1711; DSM NV v.
Commission, Case T-8/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1833; His AG v. Commission, Case T-9/89,
[1992] E.C.R. 11-499; Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case-10/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-629;
Shell Int'l Chem. Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-11/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-757; Solvay &
Cie SAv. Commission, Case T-12/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-907; Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v.
Commission, Case T-13/89 [1992] E.C.R. 11-1021; Montedipe SpA v. Commission, Case
T-14/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1155; Chemie Linz AG v. Commission, Case T-15/89, [1992]
E.C.R. 11-1275. See also, on appeal, Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni Spa, Case C-49/
92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4125; SA Hercules Chems. NV v. Commission, Case C-51/92 P,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-4235; Hftls AG v. Commission, Case C-199/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287;
Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case C-200/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4399;
Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case C-227/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4443; Shell Int'l Chem.
Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Case C-234/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4501; Montecatini SpA v.
Commission, Case C-235/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4539; Chemie Linz GmbH v. Commis-
sion, Case C-245/92 P, [1992] E.C.R. 14643; DSM NV v. Commission, Case C-5/93 P,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-4695.
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In this case, heavy fines were imposed by the Commission
on fifteen undertakings in the chemical industry for having par-
ticipated for several years in an agreement and concerted prac-
tice, whereby they formed a price cartel and introduced quota
arrangements and other measures supporting the price cartel on
the polypropylene market.2 Fourteen of the fifteen undertak-
ings thereupon brought proceedings before the CFI, claiming
that the decision should be annulled or, in the alternative, that
the fines should either be cancelled or reduced.'
As for the substance, this case raised several salient ques-
tions, the most important being the interpretation of the term,
"concerted practice," in the Treaty establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty" or "Treaty"), the extent to which the
much debated "framework agreement" could constitute a single
agreement4 within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty,' and
the collective responsibility or collective infringement of the un-
dertakings.6 In this respect, the question of each individual ap-
plicant's involvement provoked several evidentiary issues. More-
over, the plaintiffs raised many arguments, qualified by them as
procedural objections, which mainly related to the rights of the
defense and the duty to state reasons.
Apart from the substance of the case, these issues provided
the Advocate General-designated because of the legal difficulty
and the factual complexity of the case-with the opportunity to
formulate some general principles, which had seminal impor-
tance both for the case law and the legislative developments on
evidence and procedure in European Community competition
law.
2. See Commission Decision No. 86/398/EEC relating to a proceeding under Arti-
cle 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty")
(JV/31.149-Polypropylene), O.J. L 230/1 (1986).
3. See the references to these cases, supra note 1.
4. On these issues, see Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhdne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867,
at 11-921-50.
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
81, O.J. C 321E/37 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
6. On this issue, see Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-PoulencSA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at
11-953-60.
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I. EVIDENCE IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
COMPETITION LAW
Evidence is difficult to deal with on a theoretical basis.7
Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate certain leading princi-
ples as far as the autonomy and the unfettered evaluation of the
evidence, as well as the evidentiary means and the burden of
proof, are concerned. It is essential to point out from the outset
that, given that the activity of the Court of Justice, and hence
that of the CFI, is governed by the principle of the unfettered
evaluation of evidence, unconstrained by the various rules laid
down in the national legal systems, "it is only the reliability of the
evidence before" the Community courts "which is decisive when
it comes to its evaluation."8
A. Autonomy and Unfettered Evaluation of Evidence
Two principles play a role in this respect. First, there is the
principle of autonomy, meaning that only Community law gov-
erns the submission of evidence.9 Second, there is the principle
of the unfettered evaluation of evidence, 1" allowing all eviden-
tiary means to be used, the only exception being "the evidence
which cannot be used by the Commission against the undertak-
ings because it was not communicated to them during the ad-
ministrative procedure.""
The principles of autonomy and of the unfettered evalua-
7. Id. at 11-953.
8. Id. at 11-954.
9. This question may receive a more nuanced answer in the context of the imple-
mentation of Community competition rules by competition authorities and courts of
the Member States in accordance with Council Regulation No. 1/2003 on the imple-
mentation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
O.J. L 1/1 (2003). In this respect, recital 5 of Regulation No. 1/2003 provides that this
regulation affects "neither national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts
of a case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general princi-
ples of Community law."
10. On the issue of evidence before the Community courts in general, see KOEN
LENAERTS, DIRK ARTS & IGNACE MASELIS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
§§ 24-072-075, at 556-58 (2d ed. 2006); see also Christian Berger, Beweisaufname vor dem
Europdischen Gerichtshof in FESTSCHRIFr FUR ErKEHARD SCHUMANN ZUM 70. GUBERTSTAG
27 (2001); Koen Lenaerts, Rechter en partijen in de rechtspleging voor Hof en Gerecht, in
SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETCEVING: TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES EN ECONOMISCH RECHT
231 (2002).
11. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhdne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-954. On this
issue, which relates to the right to a fair process, see infra Part II.A.1.
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tion of evidence have now been confirmed by the CFI. 2 Since it
is only the reliability of the evidence before the Community
courts which is decisive when it comes to its evaluation, the CFI
has held that there is no principle of Community law which pre-
cludes the Commission from relying on a single piece of evi-
dence in order to conclude that Article 81(1) EC has been in-
fringed, provided that its probative value is undoubted and that
the evidence itself definitely attests to the existence of the in-
fringement in question. 13
The Court ofJustice has also ruled-in non-competition law
matters-that, "given that there is no legislation at Community
level governing the concept of proof, any type of evidence ad-
missible under the procedural law of the Member States in simi-
lar proceedings is in principle admissible."14 Recently, the Court
of Justice considered, on appeal in the Seamless Steel Tubes case,
that the CFI was "correct to hold that the principle that prevails
in Community law is that of the unfettered evaluation of evi-
dence and that it is only the reliability of the evidence that is
decisive when it comes to its evaluation."15 It is worth mention-
ing that in this case both the challenged CFI decisions' 6 and the
Opinion of the Advocate General before the Court of Justice 7
relied on and expressly referred to the Vesterdorf Opinion in
the Polypropylene case.
Obviously, the unfettered evaluation of evidence makes the
task of the Commission easier-it is indeed for the Commission
to establish the materiality of an infringement of the competi-
tion rules. In this context, especially for cartels, the Commission
12. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-5575, 297.
13. See Cimenteries CBR v. Commission,Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30-32, 34-39, 42-46,
48, 50-65, 68-71, 87, 88, 103, 104/95, [2000] E.C.R. II-491, 1838; see also Vesterdorf
Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, [19911 E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-955-57, 4.
14. Labis, trading as "Przedsiebiorstwo Transportowo-Handlowe" (Met-Trans) &
Sagpol SC Transport Miedzynarodowy i Spedycja,Joined Cases C-310 & 406/98, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-1797, 29.
15. Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, Case C-411/04 P, 45 (ECJ
Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported); Dalmine SpA v. Commission, Case C-407/04 P, 49
(ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported).
16. See Mannesmannr6hren-Werke AG v. Commission, Case T-44/00, [2004]
E.C.R. 11-2223, 84; Dalmine SpA v. Commission, Case T-50/00, [2004] E.C.R. 11-2395,
72. See also the third judgment of the CFI of the same day, JFE Eng'g Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases T-67, 68, 70 & 78/00, [2004] E.C.R. 11-2501, 273.
17. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v.
Commission, Case C-411/04 P, (ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported).
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is often faced with secret and complex practices, which by their
very nature, are often difficult to detect and to investigate and
the evidence of which is therefore not easy to establish. 8 These
are some of the reasons which explain the Commission's leni-
ency policy as far as fines for the infringement of Article 81 EC
are concerned. 19
B. Evidentiary Means
Since the evaluation of evidence should be unfettered in
Community competition law, the Commission is entitled, in
principle, to establish the existence of an infringement of Arti-
cles 81 and 82 EC by all means at its disposal. This can include
recourse to economic studies. These studies "often make up an
important part of the evidence in competition cases and can be
of great value to the Court in understanding the relevant eco-
nomic context. '20 Economic studies may indeed prove to be im-
portant for determining "how an oligopolistic market might re-
act in different circumstances." 2' Their evidentiary value may
thus be crucial in a concerted practice case 22 or in a concentra-
18. See Aalborg Portland A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213,
217 & 219/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-123, 55-57, in which the Court ofJustice observed
that "since the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive agreements and the
penalties which offenders may incur are well known, it is normal for the activities which
those practices and those agreements entail to take place in a clandestine fashion, for
meetings to be held in secret, most frequently in a non-member country, and for the
associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum."
19. See Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in car-
tel cases, recital 3, O.J. C 298/17 (2006). On the issue of the withdrawal, before the
Community courts, of voluntary admission resulting from the non-objection, during the
administrative procedure, to facts which have been established in the statement of ob-
jections, see infra Part II.B.2.
20. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-957; see also European Night Servs. Ltd. v. Commission, Joined Cases
T-374-375, 384 & 388/94, [1998] E.C.R. 11-3141, 93-105.
21. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhtne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-957.
22. Evidence of a concerted practice indeed raises the issue of the possibility that a
given conduct may arise without any concertedness; parallel conduct cannot be re-
garded as furnishing proof of such practice unless concert of action constitutes the only
plausible explanation of such conduct. It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether
the parallel conduct alleged by the Commission cannot, taking account of the nature of
the products, the size and the number of the undertakings and the volume of the mar-
ket in question, be explained otherwise than by concert of action, in other words
whether the evidence of parallel conduct constitutes a firm, precise and consistent body
of evidence of prior concertedness. This is why the undertakings involved may be in a
position, on the basis of economic studies, to prove that the facts that the Commission
considers cannot be explained otherwise than by concerted action, may on the contrary
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tion case. In the latter area, economic studies may serve to estab-
lish the probable evolution of the market situation and of the
conduct of certain undertakings.2" However, economic studies
"cannot take the place of legal assessment and adjudication."24
And it is precisely with reference to the Vesterdorf Opinion that
in a recent concentration case, the CFI ruled that "since in Com-
munity law it is an overriding principle that the evaluation of
evidence should be unfettered," the absence of economic studies
"establishing the likely development of the market situation and
demonstrating that there is an incentive for the merged entity to
behave in a particular way" is "not in itself decisive," in particular
where "it is obvious that the commercial interests of an under-
taking militate predominantly in favor of a given course of con-
duct, such as making use of an opportunity to disrupt a competi-
tor's business. 25
Evidence can also consist of oral statements. During the ad-
ministrative procedure, the undertakings involved are entitled to
make a request to the Commission in their written submissions
for an oral hearing in order to discuss the contents of the state-
ment of objections addressed to them. In such a case, the Com-
mission must grant an oral hearing. For third parties to the pro-
cedure, such as those who addressed a complaint to the Commis-
sion, the Commission is not bound to grant such a hearing, but
be explained in a satisfactory manner which does not contemplate any concert of ac-
tion. See Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-36/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1847,
85; Solvay SA v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. II-1775, 75; Compagnie
Royale Asturienne des Mines SA & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission,Joined Cases 29 &
30/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1679, It 16-20.
23. See Council Regulation No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations be-
tween undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), art. 2, O.J. L 24/1 (2004). For more
on this issue, see, e.g., EMMANUEL COMBE, ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE
297 (2005).
24. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-957. In the
Polypropylene case, the CFI took the view that the various economic studies produced by
the plaintiffs were not relevant, since the "concerted" character of the practice was es-
tablished by documents, whereas the "practice" was supposed to be established because
the undertakings involved remained active on the relevant market. No economic study
was at play in this regard. The CFI rejected it as irrelevant, since evidence was already
produced on the basis of documents which had been seized in the premises of one of
the undertakings involved. See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-
13/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1021, 1125-26, 77 289-93.
25. Compare Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commission, Case T-210/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-5575,
297, with Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, Case C-12/03 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-987, 1 37-51.
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may do so if it considers it is necessary.2 6
In the context of its leniency policy, the Commission may
also collect statements from undertakings which denounce a car-
tel for the purpose of enjoying immunity from fines or a reduc-
tion in the amount of such fines.2 7 The Commission is entitled
to rely on these submissions in order to establish the existence of
an infringement. Since the principle is that the evaluation of
evidence should be unfettered, this type of evidence is admissi-
ble under Community competition law. However, in the admin-
istrative procedure, the Commission does not have the power "to
compel persons to give evidence under oath." 28 The following
solution is now expressly provided in Regulation No. 1/2003:
"[I]n order to carry out" its duties, "the Commission may inter-
view any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for
the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject-
matter of an investigation. 29
Obviously, the fact that, in the administrative procedure,
the Commission does not have the power to compel persons to
give evidence under oath is one of the reasons why Commission
decisions in competition cases "rest to a large extent on docu-
mentary evidence.' In other words, in Community competi-
tion law, evidence is mainly based on documents. In this re-
spect, questions of admissibility and probative value of docu-
ments may be awkward when the Commission is relying on
anonymous documents or on documents for which it refuses to
disclose the identity of the author.3 '
In the Seamless Steel Tubes case, the plaintiffs contested the
admissibility of anonymous documents which the Commission
26. See Commission Regulation No. 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceed-
ings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, arts. 3, 4, 11-
13, OJ. L 123/18, at 20-21 (2004); previously, Commission Regulation No. 2842/98 on
the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 [now Articles 81
and 82] of the EC Treaty, arts. 5-9, O.J. L 354/18, at 20 (1998).
27. See Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in car-
tel cases, O.J. C 298/17 (2006); previously, Commission Notices on Immunity from
fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, O.J. C 45/3 (2002) and O.J. C 207/4 (1996).
On leniency, see, e.g., DOMINIQUE VOILLEMOT, GRER LA CLEMENCE (2005).
28. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-954.
29. Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 19(1), O.J. L 1/1, at 14 (2003) (emphasis added).
30. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-954.
31. It is necessary to stress that the issue of the admissibility and of the probative
value of anonymous documents is distinct from the issue of the right of access to docu-
ments containing business secrets: On this latter question, see infra Part II.A.1.
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had used as evidence against them. This objection was rejected
by the CFI. On appeal, the Court of Justice observed that re-
spect for the rights of the defense, and more broadly the right to
a fair trial, require that the undertaking concerned must have
been afforded the opportunity, during the administrative proce-
dure, to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the
facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by
the Commission to support its claim that there has been an in-
fringement.32 However, the Court of Justice rejected the plain-
tiff's claim, since it considered, in light of the principle of the
unfettered evaluation of evidence, that the fact that the docu-
ments were anonymous did not preclude their admissibility as
such.33
The Court of Justice allows only "an overall assessment of a
document's probative value. '34 The question of the probative
value of certain evidence relied on by the Commission may be a
delicate matter in circumstances where the existence of a cartel
is supported by a single document.35
C. Burden of Proof
Evidence collected by the Commission must be conclusive,
and it is for the Commission to show the existence of an in-
fringement of Articles 81 or 82 EC. That being said, the princi-
ple of the unfettered evaluation of evidence under Community
competition law may not lead to jeopardizing the respect of the
rights of the defense: "[C]onclusions drawn from the evidence
must never develop into ill-founded speculation", as there "must
be a sufficient basis for the decision, and any reasonable doubt
must be for the benefit of the applicants according to the princi-
ple in dubio pro reo.'' 36 This illustrates that there is an important
principle attached to the rule on the burden of proof in Com-
32. On the respect of the rights of the defense during the administrative proce-
dure, see infra Part II.A.
33. Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, Case C-411/04 P, 1 46-50
(ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported); Dalmine SpA v. Commission, Case C-407/04 P,
11 44-53 (ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported); see also Opinion of Advocate General
Geelhoed, Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v. Commission, Case C-411/04 P, 11 62, 65
(ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported).
34. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhfne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-954.
35. See Cimenteries CBR v. Commission,Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30-32, 34-39, 4246,
48, 50-65, 68-71, 87, 88, 103-104/95, [2000] E.C.R. 11491, 1 1838; supra Part I.A.
36. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhdne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at I1-954.
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munity competition law and now provided in Regulation No. 1/
2003, namely the presumption of innocence.
The Community courts have recognized that the principle
of the presumption of innocence, which is enshrined in Article
6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), is a fundamental
right protected in the Community legal order.38 This principle
applies to procedures concerning the infringement of the Com-
munity competition rules in view of the nature and the degree of
sanctions which can be imposed.39 It is closely linked to the
principle under which doubt must be for the benefit of the one
who is prosecuted: in dubio pro reo.4° In essence, this principle
reflects the duty of the Commission to act in conformity with the
level of proof required by law when showing the reality of cir-
cumstances which constitute an infringement.
It is now settled case law that it is for the Commission to
show the existence of an infringement by putting forward suffi-
37. According to Article 2 of Regulation No. 1/2003, "the burden of proving an
infringement of Article 81(1) EC or of Article 82 EC shall rest on the party or the
authority alleging the infringement." However, according to the very same provision,
the "undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81 (3)
EC shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled."
Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 2, O.J. L 1/1, at 8 (2003). On these issues, see Aalborg
Portland A/S v. Commission,Joined Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213, 217 & 219/00 P, [2004]
E.C.R. 1-123, 78-79; see also Publishers Ass'n v. Commission, Case T-66/89, [1992]
E.C.R. 11-1995, 5; Groupement des Cartes Bancaires "CB" & Europay Int'l SA v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases T-39 & 40/92, [1994] E.C.R. 11-49, 114; Matra Hachette SA v.
Commission, Case T-17/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-595, 1 104; John Deere Ltd. v. Commis-
sion, Case T-35/92, [1994] E.C.R. 11-957, 105; Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prij-
sregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v. Commission, Case T-29/92, [1995]
E.C.R. 11-289, 1 262; Compagnie Gnirale Maritime v. Commission, Case T-86/95,
[2002] E.C.R. 11-1011, 381.
38. See Solvay SA v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775, 59; Monte-
catini SpA v. Commission, Case C-235/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4539, 175; Hfils AG v.
Commission, Case C-199/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287, 149-150;JCB Serv, v. Commis-
sion, Case C-167/04 P, 90 (ECJ Sept. 21, 2006) (not yet reported).
39. See Oztiark v. Germany, 8544/79 [1984] E.C.H.R. 1, 12 (Feb. 21, 1984), cited in
Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-885; Lutz v. Germany,
[1987] E.C.H.R. 20 (Aug. 25, 1987).
40. The principle, in dubio pro reo, is enshrined in Article 6 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights ("ECHR") and in Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on December 7, 2000, O.J. C 364/1
(2000). It is a fundamental principle of the Community legal order. See, e.g., Hits,
[1999] E.C.R. 1-4287, 49; Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op
Elektrotechnisch Gebied & Technische Unie BV v. Commission, Joined Cases T-5 & 6/
00, [2003] E.C.R. 11-5761, 210.
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ciently precise and consistent evidence. 4 The very creation of
the CFI, as a court of both first and last instance regarding the
assessment of facts, was an express invitation to cautiously assess
evidence reported by the Commission in order to verify that the
Commission correctly relied on this evidence when adopting its
decision.4 2 Accordingly, the Community courts have annulled
decisions of the Commission when the evidence submitted was
insufficient or could have been interpreted equivocally.4 3 In-
deed, in many cases, the plaintiffs have contested that the Com-
mission relied on sufficient evidence in order to identify an in-
fringement of the competition rules and have argued that the
Commission had, by doing so, violated the principle of the pre-
sumption of innocence.44
The Commission must always provide sufficient evidence
supporting the existence of an infringement of the Community
competition rules. This burden may be difficult for the Commis-
sion, especially where it has to show that parallel conduct on a
given market resulted from an illegal concerted practice. Such
conduct may derive from the oligopolistic structure of the mar-
ket. As a result, an undertaking may be in a position to prove
that the evidence relied on by the Commission is insufficient to
establish the existence of an illegal concerted practice, as the
conduct may in fact be explained in a satisfactory manner that
does not presuppose any such concerted practice.45
In the Polypropylene case, however, the CFI considered that
the fact that the plaintiffs took part in meetings-the purpose of
which was to fix price and sales volume targets- was sufficient
for presuming their participation in the concerted practice and
that the plaintiffs could not rely either on the lack of effect of
41. See Volkswagen AG v. Commission, Case T-62/98, [2000] E.C.R. 11-2707, 1 43,
72.
42. Bo Vesterdorf, Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the
Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement, 1 COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L 14 (2005).
43. See, e.g., Co6peratieve Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Commission, Joined
Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113-114/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663; Compagnie Royale As-
turienne des Mines SA & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases 29 & 30/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 1679; SocietA ltaliana Vetro SpA v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68, 77-
78/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403.
44. See, e.g., Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni SpA, Case C-49/92 P, [1999] E.C.R.
1-4125, 1 93-94; Hfils, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287, 7 59-65; and most recently, Endesa, SA v.
Commission, Case T-417/05, 1 89-91 (CFI July 14, 2006) (not yet reported).
45. See supra note 22.
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their individual behavior on the market or on their ignorance.
The CFI decided that because of the obvious anti-competitive
nature of these meetings, even if an undertaking had not partici-
pated in the meetings in an active manner, its participation in
them without publicly distancing itself from what was discussed
led the other participants to believe that it subscribed to, and
would comply with, what had been decided there. Without a for-
mal objection from the undertaking involved, the mere partici-
pation in a meeting between competitors might suffice for
presuming its participation in the infringement.46 Moreover, ac-
cording to the Court of Justice, subject to proof to the contrary,
which the economic operators concerned must adduce, the pre-
sumption must be that the undertakings taking part in the con-
certed action and remaining active on the market take account
of the information exchanged with their competitors for the
purposes of determining their conduct on that market. In such
circumstances, the Commission does not have to adduce evi-
dence that their concerted practice had manifested itself in con-
duct on the market or that it had effects restrictive of competi-
tion.47
Even if it is the Commission that, in principle, carries the
burden of the proof, facts that the Commission is relying on may
be of a nature to compel the undertaking involved to provide an
explanation or a justification, without which it can be decided
that the burden has been satisfied.4" In assessing the evidentiary
value of a document produced by the Commission, "regard
should be had first and foremost to the credibility of the account
it contains," in particular "to the person from whom the docu-
ment originates, the circumstances in which it came into being,
the person to whom it was addressed," and whether, "on its face,
the document appears sound and reliable."49 These general
terms have been broadly used by the Community courts.5 °
46. See SA Hercules Chems. NV v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. II-
1711, 232; Solvay & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-12/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-907, 98-
100.
47. See Hills, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287, it 162, 167.
48. See Aalborg Portland A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213,
217 & 219/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-123, 79.
49. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-956.
50. See Cimenteries CBR v. Commission, Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30-32, 34-39, 42-46,
48, 50-65, 68-71, 87, 88, 103, 104/95, [2000] E.C.R. 11491, 1838; Groupe Danone v.
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II. PROCEDURE IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
COMPETITION LAW
The procedural framework of Community competition
cases consists "of an administrative procedure followed by judi-
cial review of legality," but, as to the substance, these cases
"broadly exhibit the characteristics of a criminal law case."51 This
two-sided nature is now reflected in most cases brought before
the Community courts in competition matters. Under Commu-
nity competition law, the procedure is mainly an administrative
one under the review of the Community courts. Yet, this proce-
dure is increasingly colored by criminal concerns, which have
served to shape the right to a fair trial under Community compe-
tition law.
A. Fundamental Aspects of the Administrative Procedure
In the Polypropylene case, the plaintiffs relied on several argu-
ments relating to the right of access to the file and the obligation
to state reasons. This provided the Court with the opportunity
to formulate, in very general terms, the content of the rules gov-
erning the administrative procedure. Fundamentally, these
rules provide the contours for the principle of a fair legal pro-
cess as soon as the administrative procedure is engaged in Com-
munity competition law. They imply the respect of the rights of
the defense, which includes the principle of audi alteram partem
and the right of access to the file as well as, indirectly, the duty to
state reasons in decisions finding and sanctioning an infringe-
ment of Articles 81 or 82 EC. These rules also require respect
for the principle that decisions must be given within a reasona-
ble time, i.e., the principle of the speed of the proceedings.
1. Access to the File
The principle, audi alteram partem, is an "absolutely funda-
mental principle in the administrative law of the Community,
including its competition law."'5 2 This principle, which results, as
Commission, Case T-38/02, [2005] E.C.R. 11-4407, 286 (on appeal in this latter case,
the Court of Justice did not deal with this issue: See Groupe Danone v. Commission,
Case C-3/06 P (ECJ Feb. 8, 2007) (not yet reported)); see also Opinion of Advocate
General L6ger, Compafifa espafiola para la fabricaci6n de aceros inoxidables SA (Aceri-
nox) v. Commission, C-57/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6689, 202.
51. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rhdne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-884-85.
52. Id. at 11-883.
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mentioned above, from the right to a fair legal process and the
respect of the rights of the defense, implies that the undertak-
ings concerned must be allowed access to the file and must be
given an opportunity to comment on both the facts and the legal
arguments on which the Commission's decision will be
founded.53 The concern for "sound administration and sound
administration ofjustice require persons and undertakings liable
to fines to be given full opportunity to defend themselves,"
which means that "those concerned should be apprised of all of
the relevant material."54
Indeed, it is settled case law that observance of the rights of
the defense in all proceedings in which sanctions may be im-
posed is a fundamental principle of Community law which must
be respected in all circumstances, even if the proceedings in
question are administrative proceedings. Due observance of this
principle requires that the undertakings concerned must have
been afforded the opportunity during the administrative proce-
dure to make known their views on the truth and relevance of
the facts and circumstances alleged by the Commission.55 Thus,
the purpose of providing access to the file in competition cases is
to enable the addressees of a statement of objections to examine
evidence in the Commission's file so that they are in a position
effectively to express their views on the conclusions reached by
the Commission in its statement of objections on the basis of
that evidence. Access to the file is one of the procedural safe-
guards intended to protect the rights of the defense.56
In order to assess whether incomplete access to the file vio-
lates a party's rights of the defense during the administrative
procedure before the Commission, the case law makes a distinc-
tion between incriminating or inculpatory documents, on the
one hand, and documents which could be exculpatory, on the
53. See id. at 11-892-905.
54. Id. at 11-892-93.
55. See Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R.
461, 1 9, 11; Cimenteries CBRv. Commission,Joined Cases T-10, 11, 12, 15/92, [1992]
E.C.R. 11-2667, 11 38-39; Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-37/91,
[1995] E.C.R. 11-1901, 49; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v. Commission, Joined
Cases T-305, 306, 307, 313-316, 318, 325, 328, 329, 335/94, [1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 1011;
Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 142.
56. See Cimenteries CBR, [19921 E.C.R. 11-2667, 38; BPB Indus. plc & British Gyp-
sum Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-65/89, [1993] E.C.R. 11-389, 30; Imperial Chem. Indus.,
[1995] E.C.R. 11-1901, 49.
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other. 57 In this respect, it is necessary to stress that a document
is considered incriminating towards an undertaking only if it is
used by the Commission to support its statement as to the exis-
tence of an infringement by the undertaking involved.5" The
fact that the Commission refers to a certain document in the
decision finding an infringement of the Community competi-
tion rules does not necessarily mean that it contains incriminat-
ing evidence and that the Commission intends to use it in this
way.
Nonetheless, if the Commission intends to use documentary
evidence in the decision finding an infringement of Articles 81
or 82 EC, mention should be made of that evidence in the state-
ment of objections, and it should be made available to the ad-
dressee of the statement of objections. In principle, only docu-
ments cited or mentioned in the statement of objections consti-
tute valid evidence. 59 However, documents appended to the
statement of objections, but not mentioned therein, can be re-
ported in the decision against the undertaking involved, if this
undertaking could have reasonably deduced from the statement
of objections what conclusions the Commission intended to
draw from the documents in question.6 ° If the Commission in-
tends to rely on new evidence after the statement of objections
has been notified, it has to put this evidence at the disposal of
the parties so that they can submit their observations on such
evidence. If the Commission relies on a reply to the statement
of objections or on a document annexed to such a reply in order
to prove the existence of an infringement in a proceeding under
Article 81 EC, the other parties involved in that proceeding must
be placed in a position in which they can express their views on
such evidence.61
57. On this point, for more details, see Koen Lenaerts & Ignace Maselis, European
Community Competition Law: Procedural Rights and Issues in the Enforcement of Articles 81 and
82 oftheEC Treaty, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1615, 1631 (2001); see also LENAERTS, ARTS &
MASELIS, supra note 10, §§ 7-023-035, at 216-29.
58. See Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11491, 284.
59. See AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359,
21; Shell Int'l Chem. Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-11/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-757, 1 55;
Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-13/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1021, 34;
Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11491, 323.
60. Shell Int'l Chem. Co., [1992] E.C.R. 11-757, 56; Imperial Chem. Indus., [1992]
E.C.R. 11-1021, 1 35; Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 323-324.
61. AKZO Chemie, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359, 21; Shell Int'l Chem. Co.,
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As far as documents which could be exculpatory are con-
cerned, it has not always been obvious to assess the circum-
stances in which these documents may or must be disclosed to
the parties. In his Opinion, Judge Vesterdorf nevertheless con-
sidered that "all the undertakings concerned should in principle
have access to all the documentary evidence in a complex of
cases... where it is particularly necessary to be able to arrive at a
finding on the basis of an overall assessment of all the facts and
circumstances of the case."6 2 In the same Opinion, he also ex-
pressed the view that "it is not the Commission's task to assess
what the undertaking can use for its defense."6 In this way, the
Opinion heralded new jurisprudential developments in the case
law on this matter.
Since the Hercules Chemicals judgment in the Polypropylene
case," it is settled case law that documents containing exculpa-
tory evidence must be made accessible to the parties upon their
request.65 It is worth observing here that such an obligation no
longer stems from the rules that the Commission imposes on
itself,6 6 but, more broadly, from the general principle of equality
of arms.67 Complainants and interested third parties do not en-
joy the same rights as the parties. They might be "associated
closely" with the proceedings under certain circumstances ,68 but
they are not entitled to have full access to the Commission's file.
Where the Commission issues a statement of objections relating
to a matter in respect of which it has received a complaint, it
[1992] E.C.R. 11-757, 91 55-56; Imperial Chem. Indus., [1992] E.C.R. 11-1021, 91 34-35;
Cimenteries CBR, [20001 E.C.R. 11-491, 1 386.
62. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-899.
63. Id.
64. SA Hercules Chems. NV v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1711,
54.
65. Case law requires though that such a request should be specific and refer pre-
cisely to documents to which access is requested. See Groupe Danone v. Commission,
Case T-38/02, [2005] E.C.R. 114407, 91 42-43 (on appeal brought against this judg-
ment, the Court of Justice did not deal with this issue: See Groupe Danone v. Commis-
sion, Case C-3/06 P (ECJ Feb. 8, 2007) (not yet reported)).
66. See Hercules Chems., [1991] E.C.R. 11-1711, 91 53.
67. See Solvay SA v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. I1-1775, 1 83; Impe-
rial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-36/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1847, 91 93; Ci-
menteries CBR v. Commission, Joined Cases T-25, 26, 30-32, 34-39, 4246, 48, 50-65, 68-
71, 87, 88, 103, 104/95, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 1 143; see also LENAERTS & MASELIS, supra
note 57, at 1634.
68. See Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 27(1), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
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shall provide the complainant with a copy of the non-confiden-
tial version of the statement of objections. In other cases, third
parties can only request access to documents on which the Com-
mission relies in its provisional assessment. 69 However, a right of
access to these documents might be granted on the basis of Reg-
ulation No. 1049/2001 regarding public access to documents of
the institutions."y The scope of the right of access may have to
be restricted in order to protect business secrets or the confiden-
tiality of other information. 7 1 In any case, it does not cover inter-
nal documents of the Commission,7 2 unless exceptional circum-
stances require it on the basis of serious indications provided by
the parties.73
The main difficulty lies in the need to reconcile the access
to the file with the protection of business secrets and confidenti-
ality.74 In order to prevent any abuse on the part of an undertak-
ing hiding under the umbrella of confidentiality for the sole pur-
pose of precluding the Commission from proving an infringe-
ment, Article 27 of Regulation No. 1/2003 provides that
"nothing... shall prevent the Commission from disclosing and
using information necessary to prove an infringement" of Article
81 EC or of Article 82 EC. In its notice of December 22, 2005 on
69. See Commission Regulation No. 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceed-
ings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, arts. 6-8, O.J. L
123/18 (2004).
70. Regulation No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents,
O.J. L 145/43 (2001); see also Mannesmannr6hren-Werke AG v. Commission, Case T-
44/00, [2004] E.C.R. 11-2223, 1T 43-59; Verein ffir Konsumenteninformation v. Com-
mission, Case T-2/03, [2005] E.C.R. 11-1121, 1 65-115.
71. See Hercules Chems., [1991] E.C.R. 11-1711, 1 54. "Other confidential informa-
tion" usually covers information which does not relate to business secrets, but the dis-
closure of which could cause extremely serious damage to a person or to an undertak-
ing. See Adams v. Commission, Case 145/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1-3539, 34; AKZO Chemie
BV & AKZO Chemie UK Ltd. v. Commission, Case 53/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1-1965, 29.
72. See Hercules Chems., [1991] E.C.R. II-1711, 54; BPB Indus. Plc & British Gyp-
sum Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-65/89, [1993] E.C.R. 11-389, T 29; Cimenteries CBR,
[2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 1 420; see also Commission Regulation No. 773/2004, art. 15, O.J.
L 123/18 (2004).
73. British Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. & R.J. Reynolds Indus. Inc. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1899, 1 11 (ECJ Order of June 18, 1986);
John Deere Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-35/92, [1994] E.C.A. 11-957, 1 31; Cimenteries
CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11491, 1 420; see also Lenaerts & Maselis, supra note 57, at 1631-32.
74. On this issue, see Nicole Coutrelis & Valerie Giaccobo, La Pratique de Vaccs au
dossier en droit communautaire de la concurrence: Entre droits de la defense et confidentialite,
CONCURRENCES-REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE 66 (2006) (Fr.).
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the rules for access to the file, the Commission also considers
that "the need to safeguard the rights of the defense of the par-
ties through the provision of the widest possible access to the
Commission file may outweigh the concern to protect confiden-
tial information of other parties. 75
Inculpatory documents reported by the Commission in its
decision, which have not been disclosed to the parties during the
administrative procedure, or on the basis of which the parties
could not have reasonably deduced what conclusions the Com-
mission intended to draw from such documents, cannot be re-
garded as admissible evidence. 76 However, this does not auto-
matically lead to the annulment of the decision as a whole, but,
at least, to the annulment of the objections submitted by the
Commission which can be proven only by reference to such doc-
uments.7 7 If the findings of an infringement are sufficiently sup-
ported by other evidence which have been disclosed to the un-
dertakings involved during the administrative procedure and on
which the parties were put in a position to submit their views,
violation of the rights of the defense shall not affect the validity
of the contested decision. 8
It should be added that when the Commission rejects, dur-
ing the administrative procedure, the request of one of the par-
ties to obtain access to exculpatory documents, this will consti-
tute a violation of the rights of the defense only if it is shown that
the administrative procedure might have led to a different result
had the requesting party been given access to the documents in
question. 79 The parties are required to show that the restriction
to their right of access concretely affected their possibilities to
75. See Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the European
Economic Area Agreement ("EEA Agreement") and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/
2004, paras 24-25, O.J. C 325/7, at 11 (2005).
76. See Allegemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v. Commission,
Case 107/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3151, 1 24-30; Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 1 364.
77. See Allegemeine, [1983] E.C.R. 3151, 30; Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491,
364; Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Commission, Case T-37/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1901,
71; Solvay SA v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [19951 E.C.R. 11-1775, 58.
78. See Aalborg Portland A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213,
217, 219/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-123, 73; Lenaerts & Maselis, supra note 57, at 1632-33.
79. See Cimenteries CBR, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491, 383; Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v.
Commission, Case T-36/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1847, 1 78; SA Hercules Chems. NV v.
Commission, Case T-7/89 [1991] E.C.R. 11-1711, 56; Solvay, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775,
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defend themselves, i.e., if they had been given access to these
documents during the administrative procedure, they could
have relied on elements diverging from inferences of the Com-
mission at this stage such that they could have somehow influ-
enced the content of the appraisal made by the Commission in
the decision.8s The undertaking concerned does not have to
show that if it had been given access to the non-disclosed docu-
ments, the Commission decision would have been different in
content, but only that it would have been able to use those docu-
ments for its defense.8 '
2. Statement of Reasons
Procedural safeguards under Community competition law
also require, at the stage of the administrative procedure, re-
spect for the obligation to state reasons. Article 253 EC provides
that: "Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by
the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts
adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state the rea-
sons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or
opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to" the
EC Treaty. s 2 Under Community competition law, this obligation
relates to both the finding of an infringement and the fine sanc-
tioning it.
The purpose of the reasoning requirement is "to enable ad-
dressees of acts to ascertain whether the decision is materially
correct"; it must also "serve as the basis for judicial review of the
administration's decision."83 In this way, the obligation to state
reasons is linked to the right to an effective judicial remedy and
80. See Aalborg Portland, [2004] E.C.R. 123, 75; Hercules Chems. NV v. Commis-
sion, Case C-51/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4235, 81; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v.
Commission,Joined Cases C-238, 244-45, 247, 250-52, 254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375,
318; Solvay, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775, 98.
81. See Hercules Chems., [1999] E.C.R. 1-4235, 1 78, 81; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij
[2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 1 318.
82. On the obligation to state reasons, see, e.g., LENAERTS, ARTS & MASELIS, supra
note 10, § 7-145, at 301-04; Koen Lenaerts &Jan Vanhamme, Procedural Rights of Private
Parties in the Community Administrative Process, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 531, 562 (1997);
Luis Miguel Pais Antunes, La motivation des decisions en droit communautaire de la concur-
rence, in DROITS DE LA DEFENSE ET DROITS DE LA COMMISSION DANS LE DROIT COM-
MUNAUTAIRE DE LA CONCURRENCE 273 (1994).
83. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-907.
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judicial protection." The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
confirms this reading. According to a consistent body of case
law, the purpose of the obligation to state reasons is to provide
the person concerned with sufficient information to make it pos-
sible to ascertain whether the decision is well-founded or
whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to
be contested and to enable the Community courts to review the
legality of the decision. 5
The obligation to state reasons enshrined in Article 253 EC
is considered an essential procedural requirement, the infringe-
ment of which merits annulment within the scope of Article 230
EC. It constitutes one of the fundamental principles of Commu-
nity law and can be raised by the Community judicature of its
own motion. 6 It must be remembered that judicial control of
the reasoning requirement is limited to verifying whether the de-
cision of the Commission sufficiently specifies the relevant facts
and points of law. It does not consist in confirming whether the
decision is well-founded or not. 7 The obligation to state reasons
indeed relates to the external validity of the decision. 8
The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons
depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the act in question
84. Pais Antunes, supra note 82, at 274.
85. See Dansk Rorindustri A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205-208,
213/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 462; see also Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission, Case T-
330/01, 45 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported); Asia Motors France SA v. Commis-
sion, Case T-7/92, [1993] E.C.R. II-669, 30; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commis-
sion, Case T-59/02, 91 117 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported); La Cinq SA v. Com-
mission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R. II-1, 42; M~tropole T6lvision SA v. Commis-
sion, Case T-206/99, [2001] E.C.R. 11-1057, 44.
86. See Commission v. Chambre Syndicale Nationale des Enterprises de Transport
de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval), Case C-367/95 P, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1719, 67; Dansk
Pelsdyravlerforening v. Commission, Case T-61/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1931, 129; Metro-
pole Tdlvision, [2001] E.C.R. 11-1057, 91 43.
87. See Commission v. Daffix, Case C-166/95 P, [1997] E.C.R. 1-983, 24; Sytraval,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-1719, 1 67; GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Commission, Case T-
168/01, 9 210-13 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported) (an appeal has been lodged
against thisjudgment: GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Commission, Case C-501/
06 P (case pending)); Westfalen Gassen Nederland BV v. Commission, Case T-303/02,
91 72 (CFI Dec. 5, 2006) (not yet reported).
88. See Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, at 11-908: "[I]f
a statement of reasons is based on an incorrect legal view or on a wrong assessment of
the evidence, this is not therefore a defect in the statement of reasons but, on the
contrary, a defect in the legal and factual assessment on which the decision in the case
is based."
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and the circumstances of its enactment.8 9 Competition law is un-
doubtedly one of the areas of Community law where the obliga-
tion to state reasons in individual decisions is quite extensive be-
cause of the Commission's broad discretion in finding and fin-
ing infringements of Community law in this area. In this
respect, decisions on substance-such as a decision finding an
infringement-must be distinguished from purely procedural
decisions. If, for the latter, a concise statement of reasons is suf-
ficient,9" for the former, on the contrary, it is necessary to clearly
and precisely provide the considerations of facts and law which
justify the measure taken.
However, as the Court of Justice and the CFI have consist-
ently held, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a position, in
stating the reasons for the decisions which it is required to take
in order to apply the competition rules, on all the arguments
relied on by the parties concerned. It is sufficient if it sets out
the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in
the context of the decision.9 Where a decision taken in applica-
tion of Article 81 EC relates to several addressees, it must include
an adequate statement of reasons with respect to each of the ad-
dressees, in particular those of them who according to the deci-
sion must bear the liability for the infringement. 92
The requirements of the reasoning obligation differ as be-
tween the part of the decision which relates to the finding of an
infringement and the part of the same decision which deals with
the fine. As far as the fine is concerned, the obligation to state
reasons is satisfied where the Commission indicates in its deci-
sion the factors which enabled it to determine the gravity of the
infringement and its duration.93
89. See id. at 11-907; Sytraval, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1719, 63; Akzo Nobel, 96 (CFI Sept.
27, 2006) (not yet reported); Archer Daniels Midland, 117 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet
reported); Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v. Commission, Joined Cases T-305-307,
313-316, 318, 325, 328-329, 335/94, [1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 386.
90. See, e.g., Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2859, 77 4142.
91. See La Cinq SAv. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1I-1, 41; Mdtropole
Tglision, [2001] E.C.R. 11-1057, 31.
92. See Akzo Nobel, 7 93 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported); All Weather Sports
Benelux BV v. Commission, Case T-38/92, [1994] E.C.R. 11-211, 26.
93. See Limburgse Vinyl Maaschappij NV v. Commission,Joined Cases C-238, 244-
245, 247, 250-252, 254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 1 463; Sarri6 SAv. Commission, Case
C-291/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. 1-9991, 7 73.
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The statement of reasons must in principle be notified to
the persons concerned at the same time as the decision. It must
therefore be ascertained whether, at the time of the adoption of
the contested decision, the undertakings knew with sufficient
certainty that the calculation of the amount of the fines had
been made on the basis of elements of which they had knowl-
edge.9 4 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the extent
of the obligation to state reasons is a point of law reviewable by
the Court of Justice on appeal, even if the review carried out by
the Court of Justice in this context must necessarily take into
consideration the facts on which the CFI based its conclusion as
to the adequacy or inadequacy of the statement of reasons.95
3. Speed of the Proceedings
As a procedural safeguard deriving from the right to a fair
trial, the principle of the speed of the proceedings implies an
obligation to act within a reasonable time. This principle, which
constitutes a general principle of Community law, requires that
the Commission acts within a reasonable time in adopting deci-
sions96 and, in the context of proceedings brought against a
Commission decision, that the CFI acts within a reasonable time
in delivering a judgment. 7
In this context, the reasonableness of a given period must
be appraised in light of the circumstances specific to each case
94. See Dansk Rorindustri A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205-208,
213/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 463-465.
95. See Commission v. V, Case C-188/96 P, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6561, 1 24; Dansk
Rorindustri, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 1 453.
96. See Gebrader Lorenz GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany & Land
Rh~nanie-Palatinat, Case 120/73, [1973] E.C.R. 1471, 4; Gu~rin Autos. v. Commis-
sion, Case C-282/95 P, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1503, 1 38; Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging
voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v. Commission, Case C-105/04 P, 1
35 (ECJ Sept. 21, 2006) (not yet reported); Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) Machine-
fabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v. Commission, Case 223/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4617, 11
12-17; see also Irish Sugar plc v. Commission, Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2969, 1
276; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v. Commission,Joined Cases T-305-307, 313-316,
318, 325, 328-329, 335/94, [1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 121; Stichting Certificatie Kraan-
verhuurbedrijf (SCK) v. Commission, Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, [1997] E.C.R.
11-1739, 1 56.
97. See Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission, Case C-185/95 P, [1998] E.C.R. I-
8417, 1 21; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 1 179; Thyssen Stahl AG
v. Commission, Case C-194/99 P, [2003] E.C.R. 1-10821, 1 154; Sumitomo Metal Indus.
Ltd. & Nippon Steel Corp. v. Commission,Joined Cases C-403 & 405/04 P, 91 115-122
(ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported).
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and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person
concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and
of the competent authorities.9" This list of criteria is not exhaus-
tive, and the assessment of the reasonableness of a period does
not require a systematic examination of the circumstances of the
case in light of each of them where the duration of the proceed-
ings appears justified in the light of one of them. In effect, the
function of these criteria is to determine if a delay in the treat-
ment of a particular case is justified or not.99
It should be observed that the aim of promptness-which
the Commission, at the stage of the administrative procedure,
and the Community judicature, at the stage of judicial proceed-
ings, must seek to achieve-must not adversely affect the efforts
made by each institution to establish fully the facts at issue, to
provide the parties with every opportunity to produce evidence
and submit their observations, and to reach a decision only after
close consideration of the existence of an infringement and of
the penalties. 100
As for other grounds based on the rights of the defense, a
violation of the principle of the speed of the proceedings can
lead to the annulment of the decision finding an infringement
of Community competition law only if it is shown that this viola-
tion adversely affected the rights of the defense of the undertak-
ings involved. Otherwise, a violation of the obligation to act
within a reasonable time does not affect the validity of the ad-
ministrative procedure.'0 1  Recently, the issue arose as to
whether, for the purposes of the obligation to act within a rea-
sonable time, it was necessary to distinguish the period of time
preceding the statement of objections and the rest of the admin-
istrative procedure. The Court of Justice gave a clear answer to
this question and annulled a judgment of the CFI whereby it was
held-in the light of the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, according to which the reasonable period of
98. Baustahlgewebe, [1998] E.C.R. 1-8417, 29; Thyssen Stahl, [2003] E.C.R. 1-10821,
155; Sumitomo Metal Indus. Ltd. & Nippon Steel Corp., 116 (ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet
reported).
99. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 188; Thyssen Stahl, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-10821, 156; Sumitomo Metal Indus. Ltd. & Nippon Steel Corp., 117 (ECJJan. 25,
2007) (not yet reported).
100. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 234.
101. SeeJCB Serv. v. Commission, Case C-167/04 P, 72 (ECJ Sept. 21, 2006) (not
yet reported).
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time provided under Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not run
before a person is accused t12-that the prolongation of the step
of the procedure preceding the statement of objections could
not, as such, adversely affect the rights of the defense. The
Court of Justice considered that, since the excessive duration of
the first phase of the administrative procedure may have an ef-
fect on the future ability of the undertakings concerned to de-
fend themselves, the assessment of the source of any undermin-
ing of the effectiveness of the rights of the defense must extend
to the entire procedure and be carried out by reference to its
total duration. 0 3
B. Criminal Aspects of the Administrative Procedure
Fines which may be imposed on undertakings for infringe-
ments of Community competition law "do in fact.., have a crim-
inal law character" and, most of the time, "parties' submissions
can only be understood with the help of the terminology and
concepts used in criminal law and procedure."' 4 This analysis
explains, to a large extent, the relevance of general principles of
substantive criminal law as well as the procedural safeguards spe-
cific to criminal procedure in the context of fines as sanctions
for infringements of the Community competition rules.
1. General Principles of Substantive Criminal Law
One of the essential principles of substantive criminal law is
the principle of legality in relation to crime and punishment.
Under this principle, no one can be punished for conduct which
is not prescribed as an offense by law, and the sanction or penal-
ties imposed for such offenses must be defined by law: nullum
102. See Corigliano v. Italy, [1982] E.C.H.R. 10 (Dec. 10, 1982), 34.
103. Technische Unie BV v. Commission, Case C-113/04 P, 55 (ECJ Sept. 21,
2006) (not yet reported); Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel op
Elektronisch Gebied v. Commission, Case C-105/04 P, 1 49-50 (ECJ Sept. 21, 2006)
(not yet reported).
104. Vesterdorf Opinion, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. Commission, Case T-1/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 11-867, at 885. On fines under Community competition law, see, e.g., Jean-Fran-
o:ois Bellis, La dtermination des amendes pour infraction an droit communautaire de la concur-
rence-Bilan de cinq annies d'application des lignes directrices de 1998, 39 CArHERS DE DROIT
EUROPtEN [C.D.E.] 373 (2003) (Fr.); Damien Geradin & David Henry, The EC Fining
Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional
Practice and the Community Courts'Judgments (Global Competition Law Centre, College of
Europe, Working Paper 03/05).
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crimen, nulla poena sine lege.'0 5
In the Citric Acid cartel case, the CFI was confronted with
the very issue of the legality of the fines imposed by the Commis-
sion, since the plaintiffs were challenging the provisions of Regu-
lation No. 17 that entitled the Commission to impose fines °6
and were relying to this end on the violation of the principle of
legality in relation to crime and punishment.10 7 With regard to
the question of the validity of Article 15 (2) of Regulation No. 17,
in the sense that it did not sufficiently define in advance the de-
cision-making practice of the Commission, the CFI first empha-
sized that the principle of legality in relation to crime and pun-
ishment was one of the general legal principles underlying the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and was
enshrined in various international treaties, particularly in Article
7 of the ECHR.'1 8 Then, the CFI considered that in order to
avoid an excessive regulatory rigidity and to facilitate the adapta-
tion of the rules of law to the circumstances of a particular case,
a certain level of unpredictability should be allowed regarding
the sanctions to be imposed for a given infringement. In any
case, it found that the Commission did not enjoy unlimited dis-
cretion for the setting of the amount of fines in case of infringe-
ment of the competition rules because of the ceiling of 10 per-
cent of the turnover of the undertaking laid down in the rele-
vant provision of Regulation No. 17 and because of its
Guidelines. Thus, the CFI concluded that a diligent undertaking
could adequately predict the method for setting the amount and
the amplitude of the fines to be imposed for a given conduct,
and the fact that the undertakings were not in a position to know
exactly in advance the level of the fine that the Commission
would impose in each case was not of a sufficient nature to estab-
105. On this general principle of criminal law, seeJEAN PRADEL, DROIT PENAL COM-
PARE § 42 (1995);JEAN PRADEL & GEERT CORSTENS, DROIT PItNAL EUROPEEN §§ 294-298,
300 (2d ed. 2002).
106. See Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
[now Articles 81 and 82] of the Treaty, art. 15(2), OJ. English Spec. Ed. 1, 8 (1959-
1962), as modified by Council Regulation No. 1216/99, O.J. L 148/5 (1999); now, Reg-
ulation No. 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1, art. 23(3) (2003).
107. SeeJungbunzlauer AG v. Commission, Case T-43/02, 37-68 (CFI Sept. 27,
2006) (not yet reported). In this case, the issue was specifically whether this principle,
as enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR and in the legal orders of all the Member States,
required that a legislative act, which conferred on the administration the power to in-
flict a fine, defined the amount in a sufficiently precise manner.
108. See id. 1 69-81.
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lish that Article 15(2) of Regulation No. 17 violated the principle
of legality. 1 9
Another essential general principle of criminal law is the
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws. In accordance
with this principle, any conduct which leads to a sanction must
be set down as a criminal cffence defined by law before or at the
very time it has been committed, and the sanction imposed can
only be the one defined by the law as it stands when the offence
is committed: nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia. o" 0 The
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws is enshrined in Ar-
ticle 7 of the ECHR as a fundamental right and constitutes a
general principle of Community law.11" '
The Community courts have held that this principle must
be observed when fines are imposed for infringements of the
competition rules and that it requires that the penalties imposed
correspond to those fixed at the time when the infringement was
committed. 12 As a result of the Commission's having applied its
Guidelines on the method of setting fines 1 ' immediately after
their adoption, several undertakings argued that this constituted
an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal
laws by operating an increase in the fines entailed by the new
method of setting the amount of fines provided by the Guide-
lines.
On appeal from the judgment of the CFI, the Court of Jus-
tice, sitting as a Grand Chamber, considered that a change in an
enforcement policy, in this instance the Commission's general
competition policy in the matter of fines, especially where it
comes about as a result of the adoption of rules of conduct such
109. See id. 1 82-91. Recently, the Court of Justice has in substance confirmed
this approach, in particular for the possibility to take into account a repetition of the
infringement for the fixing of the amount of a fine as far as seriousness is concerned.
See Groupe Danone v. Commission, Case G-3/06 P, 11 26-30 (ECJ Feb. 8, 2007) (not yet
reported).
I10. On this general principle of criminal law, see PRADEL, supra note 105, § 42;
PRADEL & CORSTENS, supra note 105, §§ 299, 301.
111. Dansk Rorindustri A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205-208,
213/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 202.
112. Id.
113. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2)
of Regulation No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), OJ. C 9/3 (1998). These guidelines have re-
cently been replaced by the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursu-
ant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ. C 210/2 (2006).
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as the Guidelines, may have an impact with regard to the princi-
ple of non-retroactivity. 1 4 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice
ruled that the modification introduced by the Guidelines was
reasonably foreseeable at the time when the infringements con-
cerned were committed and that the undertakings must take ac-
count of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any
time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in
the past. In applying the Guidelines in the contested decision in
question to infringements committed before they were adopted,
the Commission did not breach the principle of non-retroactiv-
ity. 1
5
2. General Principles of Criminal Procedure
Community competition law calls not only for the applica-
tion of some general principles of substantive criminal law as
mentioned above, but also for the observance of essential safe-
guards which characterize any criminal procedure. First, it is
worth mentioning the principle under which no one can be
compelled to incriminate oneself: nemo se ipsum accusare
tenetur1 6 That principle and, more broadly, the right to remain
silent signify another example of the increasing relevance of the
rights of the defense in competition law because of the "crimi-
nal" nature of the fines which are imposed on undertakings by
the Commission. 1 1 7
The Court of Justice has considered that this principle, as
interpreted by the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, applies only to a limited extent in Community competi-
tion law. Thus, the Court ruled that the Commission is entitled
to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information
concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it,
if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its posses-
sion, even if the latter may be used to establish, against it or an-
114. Dansk Rorindustri, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 1 202.
115. Id. 9 226-232; see also Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case C-
397/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4429, 99 19-26; Groupe Danone v. Commission, Case C-3/06
P, 1t 87-93 (ECJ Feb. 8, 2007) (not yet reported); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Com-
mission, Case T-329/01, 91 38-49 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported) (an appeal
has been lodged against this case: Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case C-
510/06 P (case pending)); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case T-59/02,
11 41-54 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported).
116. On this principle, see PRADEL & CORSTENS, supra note 105, at § 353.
117. See Hills AG v. Commission, Case C-199/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287, 150.
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other undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct.""
The Community courts have nevertheless held that the Commis-
sion may not, by way of a request for information, adversely af-
fect the rights of the defense of the undertaking. Consequently,
the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it
with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the
existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the
Commission to prove." 9
Recently, the Court of Justice observed that since the judg-
ment in Orkem v. Commission, 120 there have been further develop-
ments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
which the Community judicature must take into account when
interpreting fundamental rights. The Court stated, however, in
that regard that those developments were not such as to put in
question the statements of principle in Orkem. 2 1 It follows that
the undertaking concerned must, if the Commission so requests,
provide the Commission with documents which relate to the sub-
ject-matter of the investigation, even if those documents could
be used by the Commission in order to establish the existence of
an infringement. As long as the Commission's request for infor-
mation is not such as to require the undertaking to admit its
participation in infringements of the Community competition
rules, there is no violation of the rights of the defense. 2 2
It should be added that the principle not to incriminate
oneself raises specific issues in Community competition law in
the context of the Commission's leniency policy, which consists
of encouraging undertakings to actively cooperate with the Com-
mission at the investigation stage or else to run the risk of very
high fines. Since undertakings are not at all compelled to coop-
erate with the Commission and are free to do so or not, with the
risk not to get a reduction of the fine on the basis of the leniency
notice, the principle not to incriminate oneself is not violated in
118. See Mannesmannr6hren-Werke AG v. Commission, Case T-112/98, [2001]
E.C.R. 11-729, 91 65; Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 34.
119. See Commission v. SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04 P, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5915,
42; Mannesmannrhren-Werke AG, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729, 91 67; Limburgse Vinyl Maat-
schappij NV v. Commission,Joined Cases T-305-07, 313-316, 318, 325, 328, 329 & 335/
94, (1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 449; Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 91 34-35.
120. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3283.
121. See SGL Carbon, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5915, 91 43; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 91 274-276.
122. See SGL Carbon, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5915, 9191 44-46.
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this context.1 23
Second, it is necessary to highlight the right to withdraw a
voluntary admission of an infringement. Under this right, the
accused can always withdraw, before the court, a prior voluntary
admission. This right is widely recognized in criminal law; it is in
general excluded in civil matters, however. In Community com-
petition law, the question is whether an undertaking is entitled
to modify its submissions by which it has admitted an infringe-
ment, that is to say, whether it may contest before the Commu-
nity courts facts that this undertaking has admitted before the
Commission.
This question arises specifically in the context of the cooper-
ation of the undertakings for leniency purposes. In its 1996 leni-
ency notice, the Commission undertook to grant a reduction of
10 percent to 50 percent of the fine that would have been im-
posed if an undertaking had not cooperated where, after receiv-
ing a statement of objections, such undertaking informs the
Commission that it does not substantially contest the facts on
which the Commission bases its allegations. 24 Even if this
scheme is not expressly provided in the subsequent leniency no-
tices of the Commission,1 25 nothing precludes the Commission
from granting a reduction for an undertaking's non-contestation
of anti-competitive conduct alleged in the statement of objec-
tions. 26 Obviously, such a scheme greatly facilitates the task of
123. See Roquette Frores SA v. Commission, Case T-322/01, 266 (CFI Sept. 27,
2006) (not yet reported). Most recently, see Dalmine SpA v. Commission, Case C-407/
04 P, 34 (and the cases cited therein) (ECJ Jan. 25, 2007) (not yet reported). In his
Opinion in this case, Advocate General Geelhoed underscored: "The right of a legal or
natural person under investigation concerning possible infringement to the competi-
tion rules of the EC Treaty not be compelled to incriminate oneself belongs to the
principles of the right to a fair trial, under which the rights of the defense must be
respected," with "the key element of this principle being ... that no one can be com-
pelled to incriminate oneself." According to the Advocate General, it follows that "if
there is no pressure, the party involved in the investigation is in a position to decide
freely if and how it shall answer the questions asked." Opinion of Advocate General
Geelhoed, Dalmine SpA v. Commission, Case C-407/04 P, 1 23, 25 (ECJJan. 25, 2007)
(not yet reported) (official English translation not yet available).
124. See Commision Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in car-
tel cases, OJ. C 207/4 (1996).
125. See Commision Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in car-
tel cases, point D, second indent, OJ. C 298/17 (2006); Commision Notice on Immu-
nity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ. C 45/3 (2002).
126. Either in the framework of the last leniency notice or, for infringement other
than cartels, in the framework of the Guidelines on setting the amount of fines which
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the Commission in case of proceedings brought before the CFI,
the center of gravity of the litigation logically becoming not the
issue of the existence and the evidence of an infringement, but
rather, the issue of the amount of the fine. 12 7 Notably, the Court
ofJustice has held that such a scheme did not affect the rights of
the defense. 28 Although the case law of the CFI could appear
unsettled on this point, 29 the Court of Justice has, at least im-
pliedly, recognized the right of an undertaking, having been
granted a fine reduction for admission to the Commission of
facts constituting anti-competitive conduct, to contest the same
facts before the CFI.130
Third, the principle of non bis in idem"' should also be un-
derlined. This principle constitutes a fundamental principle of
leave the possibility to the Commission to grant the reduction of a fine "where the
undertaking concerned has effectively cooperated with the Commission." See Guide-
lines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation
No. 1/2003, para. 29, OJ. C 210/2 (2006).
127. See Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Joined Cases T-236, 239, 244-246,
251-252/01, [2004] E.C.R. 11-1181, 91 112.
128. See Compafifa espafiola para la fabricaci6n de aceros inoxidables SA (Aceri-
nox) v. Commission, Case C-57/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6689, 99 89-90; ThyssenKrupp
Stainless GmbH v. Commission, Joined Cases C-65 & 73/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6773,
53.
129. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case T-224/00, [2003] E.C.R.
11-2597, 99 226-227; Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v. Commission, Case T-61/99, [2003]
E.C.R. 11-5349, 99 208-209; Minoan Lines SA v. Commission, Case T-66/99, [2003]
E.C.R. 11-5515, 9 357-358; Tokai Carbon, [2004] E.C.R. 11-1181, 108; Scandinavian
Airlines Sys. AB v. Commission, Case T-241/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-2917, 91 232-241;
Groupe Danone v. Commission, Case T-38/02, [2005] E.C.R. 114407, 509 (on appeal
brought against this latter judgment, the Court of Justice has not dealt with this issue.
See Groupe Danone v. Commission, Case C-3/06 P (ECJ Feb. 8, 2007) (not yet re-
ported)).
130. See Minoikes Grammes ANE (Minoan Lines SA) v. Commission, Case C-121/
04 P, 66 (ECJ Order of Nov. 17, 2005) (unpublished); Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v.
Commission, Case C-111/04 P, 91 (ECJ Order of Feb. 16, 2006) (unpublished);
Strintzis Lines Shipping SA v. Commission, Case C-110/04 P, 63 (ECJ Order of Mar.
30, 2006) (unpublished). The Court of Justice ruled that the fact that an undertaking
which has been granted a reduction in its fine in recognition of its cooperation, subse-
quently seeks the annulment of the decision finding the infringement of the competi-
tion rules and imposing a penalty on the undertaking responsible for the infringement,
this could not entail a new assessment of the extent of the reduction which had been
granted, such action being a normal consequence of the exercise of the remedies pro-
vided for in the Treaty and the Statute of the Court of Justice.
131. On this principle, see PRADEL, supra note 105, § 42; PRADEL & CORSTENS, supra
note 105, §§ 50-53. Specifically in competition law, see WOUTER P.J. Wits, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 93-128 (2005).
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Community law, '1 2 which is enshrined in Article 4(1) of Protocol
No. 7 of the ECHR 1'33 and which has been reaffirmed in Article
50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. 3 4 The principle of non bis in idem precludes, in competi-
tion matters, an undertaking from being found guilty or pro-
ceedings from being brought against it a second time on the
grounds of anti-competitive conduct in respect of which it has
already been penalized or declared not liable by a previous un-
appealable decision. 1 35
In general, the application of this principle is subject to the
threefold conditions of identity of the facts, unity of offender
and unity of the legal interest protected. Under this principle,
the same person cannot be sanctioned more than once for a sin-
gle unlawful course of conduct designed to protect the same le-
gal asset. 13' The application of this principle therefore presup-
poses that a ruling has been given on the question whether an
offence has in fact been committed or that the legality of the
assessment thereof has been reviewed. In this way, the principle
of non bis in idem merely prohibits a fresh, in-depth assessment of
132. See Gutrmann v. Commission, Joined Cases 18 & 35/65, [1966] E.C.R. 149, at
172; Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, Case 7/72, [1972] E.C.R. 1281, 3;
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v. Commission, Joined Cases C-238, 244-245, 247,
250-252 & 254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 59; SGL Carbon AG v. Commission, Case
C-308/04 P, [20061 E.C.R. 1-5977, 26.
133. According to Article 4(1) of Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR, "no one shall be
liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of
the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or con-
victed in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State."
134. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 40, art.
50: "[N]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for
an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within
the Union in accordance with the law."
135. See Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappj, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 59. On the basis of
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR, supra note 133, the scope of the principle is
limited to the courts of one State. Therefore, it does not exclude, in principle, that the
same person be condemned for the same infringement in another State. See Archer
Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case T-224/00, [2003] E.C.R. II-2597, It 85-86;
Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Joined Cases T-236, 239, 244-246, 251-252/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 11-1181, 7 130; see also Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case
C-397/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4429, 1 48-52.
136. See SGL Carbon, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5977, 29; Federation Nationale de la Coop-
6ration Betail et Viande (FNCBV) v. Commission, Joined Cases T-217 & 245/03, 1 340
(CFI Dec. 13, 2006) (not yet reported); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission,
Case T-59/02, 61 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported); Aalborg Portland A/S v.
Commission,Joined Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213, 217 & 219/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. 123, 1
338.
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the alleged commission of an offence which would result in the
imposition of either a second penalty, in addition to the first, in
the event that liability is established a second time, or a first pen-
alty in the event that liability not established by the first decision
is established by the second.1
7
This principle may be relied on in different ways in Commu-
nity competition practice. In a first series of cases, the issue was
whether the principle of non bis in idem excluded the possibility
of a sanction by the Commission after a sanction had been in-
flicted by a national authority of a Member State for the very
same infringement. In the Walt Wilhelm case, the Court of Jus-
tice accepted the possibility that two procedures being con-
ducted separately could lead to the imposition of consecutive
sanctions, but ruled that a general requirement of natural justice
demanded that any previous punitive decision must be taken
into account in determining any sanction which is to be im-
posed. 38 In any case, the question is now different in the con-
text of Regulation No. 1/2003, as both Community and national
authorities apply the same rules for agreements and practices
which may affect trade between Member States.1"9
In a second series of cases, the Court of Justice was con-
fronted with the question whether the principle of non bis in idem
was applicable to situations where the Commission had adopted
a new decision finding an infringement whereas a prior decision
based on the same facts had been annulled on procedural
grounds. In this context, the Court of Justice ruled that, since:
The application of that principle presupposes that a ruling
has been given on the question whether an offence has in fact
been committed or that the legality of the assessment thereof
has been reviewed . . . it does not in itself preclude the re-
sumption of proceedings in respect of the same anti-competi-
tive conduct where the first decision was annulled for proce-
dural reasons without any ruling having been given on the
substance of the facts alleged .... "'
137. See Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 60-61.
138. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, [1969] E.C. R. 1, 11; see also
Trefileurope Sales SARL v. Commission, Case T-141/89, [19951 E.C.R. 11-791, 191;
Sotralentz SA v. Commission, Case T-149/89, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1127, 29.
139. On this point, see Emil Paulis & Cline Gauer, Le reglement n2 1/2003 et le
principe du ne bis in idem, CONCURRENCES-REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE 32
(2005) (Fr.).
140. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 60, 62. Thus, the adop-
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Finally, in a third series of cases, the undertakings involved
relied on the principle of non bis in idem or, more precisely, on a
corollary to this principle, namely that concurrent penalties con-
cerning the same facts should be taken into account, 14' in order
to obtain the deduction of the fine paid outside the Community
from the fine imposed by the Commission or at least a reduction
of the latter fine. These pleas have always been rejected. The
Community courts have indeed considered that either the legal
orders in question were different and protected different legal
interests,' 4 2 or that the plaintiff was not able to establish the
identity of facts on the basis of which the fines had been im-
posed'4 3 or the unity of the offender. 4"
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing remarks, the treatment of impor-
tant issues of evidence and procedure in European Community
competition law, which have largely been inspired by the semi-
nal Vesterdorf Opinion in the Polypropylene case, demonstrate
that over the past sixteen years, the relevant case law and Com-
munity legislation have developed so as to strike a balance be-
tween that of safeguarding the effectiveness of the rights of the
defense of undertakings involved in competition law proceed-
ings and that of ensuring the full effectiveness of the enforce-
ment of the European competition rules, infringements of
which the Commission is charged to uncover and sanction in the
face of often covert behavior exhibited by many such undertak-
tion by the Commission of a new decision after the annulment of a first decision for
lack of evidence can only take place if this new decision is based on new facts or on the
discovery of new facts. For such an interpretation, see Wiis, supra note 131, at 104.
141. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case C-397/03 P, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-4429, 1 46; SGL Carbon, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5977, 1 27.
142. See Buchler & Co. v. Commission, Case 44/69, [1970] E.C.R. 773, 11 52-53;
SGL Carbon, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5977, 1 29. See also Gencor v. Commission, Case T-102/96,
[1999] E.C.R. 11-753, 11 103-106; Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Commission,Joined Cases T-
236, 239, 244-246, 251-252/01, [2004] E.C.R. 11-1181, 134; Roquette Frres SAv. Com-
mission, Case T-322/01, 281 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported);Jungbunzlauer
AG v. Commission, Case T-43/02, 1 287 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet reported); Archer
Daniels Midland Co. v. Commission, Case T-59/02, 1 63 (CFI Sept. 27, 2006) (not yet
reported).
143. See Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, Case 7/72, [1972] E.C.R.
1281, 1 5; Archer Daniels Midland Co., [2006] E.C.R. 1-4429, 53-66; Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. Commission, Case T-224/00, [2003] E.C.R. 11-2597, 1 101.
144. See Federation nationale de la cooperation b~tail et viande (FNCBV) v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases T-217 & 245/03, 1 344 (CFI Dec. 13, 2006) (not yet reported).
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ings. It is in this way that the legacy of the Vesterdorf Opinion
will continue to contribute to the procedural "due process" of
law in the field of European Community competition law for the
years to come.
